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Foreign Investment in Mexico: Rules,
Regulations, and Implementation by
Regulatory Agencies
I. UNITED STATES-MEXICO INBOUND AND OUTBOUND
INVESTMENT: IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES
ROBERT E. LUTZ:*
Historically, borders serve important purposes. They provide se-
curity, create a sense of national identity, and regulate the influx of
goods and persons. Today, despite the continued utility of national
borders, trading blocks, which make such borders a great deal more
porous, have developed around the world and others are being pro-
posed, lured by the many benefits trade and investment offer. These
trading blocks are sanctioned by GATT.
The current proposal for a free trade agreement with Mexico,
and tri-laterally with Canada, provides the United States with a
unique opportunity to extend commercial activity to Central and
South America. Central America, a strife-filled area through the
1980s, and South America, plagued by governmental instability and
corruption, have been forgotten continents for commercial activity
over the past few decades. While free trade blocks provide new
chances, they also pose potential problems. Countries included in
these groups trade with each other; those who are excluded, do not.
With NAFTA, Mexico must also confront its historically
strained relationship with the United States. For that matter, the
United States-Canada relationship has been equally problematic. This
was illustrated by a statement made some years ago by Canadian
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, "The situation of the U.S. and its
northern neighbor is like a mouse sleeping next to an elephant. The
mouse is never quite sure what part of the elephant's anatomy will
move next."
The United States has also experienced serious problems with
Mexico in recent years. These problems include immigration, drug
* B.A., University of Southern California, 1968; J.D., University of California, Berke-
ley (Boalt Hall), 1971. Professor Lutz is currently a faculty member at Southwestern Univer-
sity School of Law and has taught International Business Law, Comparative Law, Public
International Law, International Environmental Law, Transnational Litigation and Arbitra-
tion, Property Law, Administrative Law, and Environmental Law.
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trafficking, a debt imbalance, human rights conflicts, and environmen-
tal disputes. Many experts' views of Mexico in the world economy is
summed up by the old cich6, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so
close to the United States."
Notwithstanding these many problems, the North American
Free Trade Agreement suggests a new, positive, and bold develop-
ment. This agreement, called Tratado de Libre Comercio ("TLC"),
calls for some harsh measures. However, NAFTA seeks to improve
the economic and environmental well-being of both countries.
The following panel attempts to explore the legal aspects of in-
vestment opportunities related to developments of the "new" Mexico.
In addition, this panel will consider the future impact of NAFTA
and explore future investment with Mexico.
II. EFFECT OF PRIVATIZATION ON THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
JORGE SANTISTEVAN:*
Following the period of Mexico's economic decline in the 1980s,
the Salinas government undertook to privatize Mexican companies
and thus assist in internationalizing the Mexican economy. The for-
eign exchange reserves have effected this effort. In the mid-1980s, for-
eign exchange reserves reached $13.5 billion and have since increased
to $16 billion. This increase results from the privatization plan. For
example, the privatization of the Mexican telephone company netted
the government some $1.7 billion. Furthermore, it is expected that
the aging commercial banks will be sold at 1.5 times their book value.
Great competition now exists amongst Mexican investors to actively
participate in the internationalization of the Mexican economy. Be-
cause of this competition, these companies will be willing to pay pre-
miums far in excess of the expected 1.5 times book value. For
example, to acquire Banco Nacional de M6xico ("Banamex") in the
most recent privatization, investors paid 2.62 times book value. Thus,
the government receives additional capital which it uses to solve so-
cial problems while maintaining a solid balance sheet.
The process of bank privatization also impacts the magnitude
and sophistication of transactions that the California offices and sub-
* L.L.B., Escuela Libre de Derecho, Mexico; Master of Comparative Law, University
of Illinois; J.D., Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law. Mr. Santis-
tevan is an attorney and counselor at law on corporate and international business transactions
and is Of Counsel to the law firm of Laffan, Mues y Kaye, in Mexico City. He has more than a




sidiaries of Mexican banks in New York and elsewhere will under-
take. Before the nationalization in 1982, Mexican banks, through
their New York or Nassau offices, provided dollar financing to major
United States corporations with Mexican subsidiaries. Due to the
scarcity of capital, Mexican banks stopped providing these services
throughout the 1980s.
Even with the current process of privatization, however, a gap
period will occur between the privatization and the time when the
Mexican banks will again play a significant role in aiding foreign in-
vestors or entrepreneurs who desire to actively participate in the Mex-
ican economy. This delay results in part from the privatization
process itself. Currently, no shareholder may maintain more than a
five percent interest in any company. Thus, a broad board of direc-
tors will exist in order to obtain a consensus. Due to the high premi-
ums paid to acquire the banks, and the need to catch up as the market
evolves, a delay of between one and two years is expected.
III. FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION
A considerable foundation for the expansion of the Mexican
economy has already been laid. At least two Mexican banks,
Banamex and Banca Serfin, grant credit to venture capital funds in
the United States so that those funds will be able to provide reciprocal
investment in Mexico. In the case of Banamex, the venture capital
fund supports the development of new technologies that are consid-
ered valuable to Mexico. In return for the venture capital, the start-
up companies will license the new technology to Mexican companies
at a reduced fee. As the major Mexican banks establish operations in
the United States, they will probably follow this pattern of reciprocal
investment.
In addition, the expansion of Mexican banks outside Mexico
should be accelerated by the laws that have been passed to encourage
bank privatization. Under existing law, foreigners can own up to
thirty percent of a Mexican bank's stock. However, Mexican banks
currently sell at two to three times the value of their net worth, or
book value. A United States bank's decision to invest in a particular
Mexican operation will probably depend on whether the bank has a
long term relationship with its Mexican counterpart, one that pre-
dated the nationalization of banks. Thus, while some United States
banks, like Mellon Bank in Mexico City and Bank of America Repre-
sentative Office in Monterrey, have been closing offices, others, like
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First Interstate Bank in Monterrey, have been establishing new
operations.
The adoption of NAFTA would provide general deregulation of
financial services and would probably encourage investment in Mexi-
can financial institutions. Currently, only Citicorp operates a branch
in Mexico. The NAFTA negotiations should result in the opening
and liberalization of the financial markets. This could even lead to
the establishment of United States brokerage houses in Mexico.
Although some Mexican brokerage houses operate offices in New
York, United States firms are not yet active in Mexico. This may be
because current Mexican transactions are small by United States stan-
dards. This situation should change, however, when the Mexico City
Stock Exchange expands. Moreover, Mexico's current regulatory en-
vironment also inhibits foreign investment.
IV. CURRENT RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
The rules and regulations governing foreign investment in Mex-
ico are substantial. Under the present system, the regulatory outcome
depends on whether a company's activities fall within the classifica-
tion scheme of the foreign investment regulations. Some activities are
completely reserved for Mexican citizens, while other activities, such
as certain types of mining, are limited to no more than forty-nine per-
cent foreign ownership. Other regulations, nonetheless, allow for to-
tal foreign ownership of activities. Nevertheless, it is better to start a
Mexican subsidiary than to open a branch office.
In general, obtaining the required authorization to open branch
offices in Mexico is difficult, even when the foreign investment rules
are satisfied. This may represent a political preference for companies
that are actually located in Mexico and who are substantially Mexi-
can. However, companies such as financial service and insurance bro-
kerages, whose activities fall within the lenient portions of the
classification scheme, encounter little trouble in obtaining authoriza-
tions from the National Commission of Foreign Investments. The
Commission strongly favors foreign investment and approves most in-
vestments within the lenient classifications.
Even if a company's activities do not implicate the regulatory
classifications, the company must follow a number of basic rules in
obtaining 100% foreign ownership of a Mexican operation. In addi-
tion, a $100 million limit on pre-operation capitalization applies.
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Most important is a control on the balance of the investment's foreign
currency account. This requirement lasts for the first three years of
the company's existence and ensures that there is no net outflow of
currency from Mexico. The foreign corporation can keep its currency
account in balance by retaining sufficient funds in a Mexican bank.
However, most companies care little about the currency limitation.
Instead, they reinvest their profits inside Mexico until the three year
limitation expires.
Nonetheless, foreign currency account rules may cause problems
for companies wishing to import goods for distribution in Mexico.
This problem can be solved by creating a joint venture with a majority
of Mexican shareholders. The foreign investment regulations apply
only when foreign ownership exceeds forty-nine percent. However, if
equity participation by foreigners occurs, the participation must be
recorded at the Foreign Investment Registry. Therefore, these regula-
tions provide a framework in which foreign investors must work in
order to invest in the Mexican Market.
The overall tenor of Mexican government activity strongly sup-
ports pro-foreign investment, although the Mexican Constitution de-
mands the regulation of foreign investment. Fernando Hefty,
Technical Secretary of the National Commission of Foreign Invest-
ments, publicly stated that the President set the 1981 goal for Mexi-
can foreign investment at $26 billion. This attitude favoring foreign
investment appears permanent. The government has also established
several incentive programs to promote export activity.
V. MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S EXPORT PROGRAMS
The Mexican government has initiated various programs to en-
courage exports. For example, a foreign company establishing an en-
tity in Mexico who participates in these programs is not limited by the
Foreign Investment Regulations, unless the activities are limited to
the Government, Mexican citizens, or a specified percentage of
foreign investment. Thus, beneficiaries of such programs are not
required to comply with Article 5 of the Foreign Investment
Regulations.
One such export program is the Temporary Imports to Produce
Exports Program ("PITEX"). Under PITEX, participants must
demonstrate at least $500 thousand or ten percent of production in
exports to receive certain benefits, such as duty-free importation of
raw materials and lubricants. If exports total thirty percent of pro-
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duction or more, then participants receive duty-free importation of
production assets. The Foreign Trade Companies Act provides the
same benefits, but requires more capital and exports. The benefit
under the Foreign Trade Companies Act is a waiver of the value ad-
ded tax on imports and high exporting companies program. Financial
incentives also result from, for example, Banco Nacional de
Comerciale. Further, information and contacts with foreign markets
are also provided.
VI. MEXICAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT TODAY
ANDREW DEMETRIOU:*
In order to better understand the current business conditions in
Mexico, one must look back at the negative business conditions of the
1980s. At that time, the Mexican inflation rate rose above 150%, and
the interest rates were also very high. The economy and its markets
were closed, relative to today, due to high levels of involvement by the
government in practically all sectors of the economy. Capital flight
resulted from these negative conditions, such that even Mexican in-
vestors removed badly needed financial resources from the Mexican
Banks.
In contrast, many experts widely recognize the Salinas adminis-
tration's efforts to change these prevailing conditions after the 1980s.
The administration sought to control inflation and to depart from a
centralized economy, creating perhaps the most open market in Latin
America. Indeed, Salinas attempted to make the Mexican economy
more market and export oriented.
In order to evaluate foreign investments, a comparison of invest-
ment figures from the 1980s and 1990s is useful. As of 1982, the total
accumulative foreign investment was quite low, barely $7 billion.
Yet, even with the negative conditions of the 1980s, total cumulative
foreign investment at the end of 1989 reached over $26 billion. Thus,
total cumulative foreign investment tripled during the decade. De-
spite this fact, many concede that the 1980s was a lost decade in terms
of real economic gains.
The 1980s also witnessed a scarcity of capital. Little available
B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1976; J.D., University of California,
Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1979. Mr. Demetriou is a partner in the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue. He has been involved in the past two years in representing Mexican interests seeking to
enter the United States market. He sits on his firm's Latin American Task Force and has been
responsible for developing a practice plan for Mexico.
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money existed for the Mexican borrower or industrialist. This scar-
city of capital resulted from the nationalization of Mexican banks.
Following the 1980s, the efforts of the Salinas Administration brought
about the privatization and liberalization of the Mexican banks. This
development will hopefully lead to a future abundance of capital.
Unable to obtain capital in the financial markets, Mexican com-
panies attempted to emulate their United States counterparts by tap-
ping the equity markets. Unfortunately, while the Mexico City Stock
Exchange, the Bolsa, is very active, it is very small compared to
United States exchanges. The Bolsa's total market capitalization
would rank it ninth in market value against individual United States
companies. If Japanese companies were added to the list, the Bolsa
would rank outside the top twenty. The further addition of European
companies would place over fifty companies above the market value
of the entire Mexico City Stock Exchange. Thus, this market must
expand to provide a viable source of capital.
Due to its history of hyper-inflation, Mexico's credit markets are
perhaps worse for Mexican companies. Even at the more moderate
levels of inflation currently seen, capital is loaned at rates of 30 to
50% per year. Due to persistent fears of inflation, banks offer short
term horizons, nine months or less, for maturity on any debt. This
constant refund of very expensive money retards expansion. To sup-
port their United States operations, Mexican companies borrow from
United States banks at lower interest rates. However, they cannot
similarly fund their Mexican operations due to problems in perfecting
security interests with Mexican collateral and the United States
banks' uncertainty over the Mexican companies' long term prospects.
As a result, Mexican corporations seek capital through United States
expansion. Mexican companies seek to improve their businesses and
access to technology through joint ventures with United States com-
panies. Thus, NAFTA will create United States investment and allow
Mexican investment to come north.
These developments during the 1980s engendered the negotia-
tions for NAFTA. Because Mexico will open its borders, enormous
amounts of capital are required to modernize the economy, generate
more jobs, and internationalize products. Investors, or services prov-
iders for financial industry, now possess a unique opportunity in the
emerging Mexican economy.
As for small investors in Mexico, the manufacturing industry in
Mexico experienced exceptional growth during the 1980s, increasing
1993]
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ten fold from 1980 to 1989. In addition, the presence of large United
States manufacturing entities in Mexico created numerous small and
mid-size companies. As the economy expands, opportunity for new
businesses will increase as well. Over two thousand companies in
Mexico were established in anticipation of NAFTA. Moreover, moti-
vated by global competitiveness, some investors sought lower produc-
tion costs and transferred to Mexico, despite the scarcity of capital
and financing.
The scarcity of capital strongly influences the pattern of develop-
ment. Because few dollars were available through the Mexican bank,
many development plans were self-financed. Newly constructed fac-
tories were self-financed by Mexican developers who either sold
shares to permit the construction or used their own money. The
United States manufacturers brought their own equipment, which
was not financed by United States banks due to their concern with the
Mexican economy's stability.
VII. CURRENT LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE MEXICAN
ECONOMY'S FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
The current legal environment for Mexican investment is com-
paratively good. However, important differences exist between laws
in the United States and Mexico. For example, differences in the pre-
ferred means of asset ownership between the United States and Mex-
ico create embarrassing situations. A foreign investor in the United
States can unexpectedly confront a lawsuit on behalf of unknown per-
sons or be prosecuted by unknown government agencies. A number
of Mexican investors have been wiped out by such unexpected
problems.
A. Anti-trust and Trade Competition
A primary area of significant difference between the two coun-
tries is the laws on anti-trust and trade competition. In Mexico, it is
very common to hear talk of the "grupo," or the family-controlled
pockets of concentrated wealth. Mexico bears a history of control of
seventy to eighty percent of its non-state owned markets by a single or
small group of companies. When Mexican interests attempt to extend
this practice into the United States, they discover that United States
law prohibits such arrangements. Both the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Justice Department prosecute excessive concentrations of
ownership, and competitors may sue to prevent concentrated market
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shares in an industry. This different perspective surprises Mexican
companies accustomed to the security and practices of their home
markets.
For example, Cemex acquired its major competitor in Mexico,
Empresas Tolteca de Mexico. The Mexican government approved the
acquisition even though Cemex gained approximately seventy percent
of the bulk cement market in Mexico. Cemex then obtained assets in
the United States, which overlapped with its existing trading assets
and conferred on Cemex substantial dominance in the markets of
Phoenix, the Southwest, and Southern California. The acquisition,
although approved by Mexico, was rejected in the United States.
Thus, Cemex was forced to consolidate, divest and retreat from the
markets because of the differences in the legal structures.
B. Dumping
Similar problems arise regarding product dumping. Mexican
companies have historically been brought before the International
Trade Commission and its predecessors when Mexican businesses ob-
tain advantages through means which are impermissible in the United
States. Mexican companies often own market-shares of seventy to
eighty percent and dictate domestic prices. However, if Mexican pro-
ducers transfer their prices to the United States, United States com-
petitors sue. The Americans claim that the product is being dumped
in the United States market at a price below the selling price in Mex-
ico. When a producer controls the home market selling price, it can
dictate whether that price is above or below the transfer price.
C. Disclosure
Another problem area emerges in disclosure of ownership. Mex-
ican companies do not customarily disclose their ownership. Rather,
a web of interlocking family trusts and off-shore holding corporations
exists in Mexico. The Mexicans are extremely private and decline to
disclose the sources of their wealth to outsiders. However, when these
Mexican companies enter the United States and apply for a license to
operate a business, they must fully disclose ownership. For example,
Cemex leased a cement terminal from the port of San Diego. The
port employed detailed questions regarding ownership of this subsidi-
ary. Twenty pages of explanation were required to describe the inter-
locking ownerships leading to members of the Zambrano family in
Monterrey. Such information would never have been disclosed in
1993]
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Mexico. At times, it becomes necessary to negotiate the extent of
ownership disclosure to satisfy United States government agencies.
D. Securities Market
Currently, it is uncertain how the United States restrictions on
cross-ownerships between banks and securities firms will affect Mexi-
can entities. The Glass-Steagall Act has been relaxed by federal re-
serve regulations, and there is a significant movement to repeal it
altogether. An example originated in the Banamex privatization, in
which the largest Mexican broker dealer, Acciones y Valores, bought
Banamex. For some time prior, Banamex operated a substantial sub-
sidiary in California. The United States government supports forcing
divestiture of the United States subsidiary simply because the acquisi-
tion took place off-shore. Nonetheless, this could constitute an un-
warranted extra-territorial expansion of the Glass-Steagall Act and
the United States government's position may prove untenable.
E. Immigration
Immigration problems have plagued the United States and Mex-
ico for many years. The United States possesses agreements with
many countries, such as Japan, which grant their citizens a "treaty
trader" or "E" visa. This visa is easily acquired and requires no
showing of an established business in the United States. It allows un-
limited entry and exit for five years. However, Mexico possesses no
such agreement with the United States, although NAFTA may estab-
lish that privilege.
Currently, Mexicans must pursue the alternative of the class "B"
or business visitor visa. This visa, however, disallows an executive's
local compensation. Since executives cannot be paid out of United
States accounts, they are compensated through Mexican accounts in
pesos, and then processed through intra-company charges. This prac-
tice becomes very complicated from a financing standpoint. More-
over, the "B" visa must be renewed periodically or extended, which
may result in unpleasant encounters with uncooperative INS agents.
Thus, the availability of the "E" visa would enormously benefit the
Mexican companies eligible to use it.
F Government Contracts
Problems with government contracts remain. The prior violation
of laws regulating product content created, in this climate of intense
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competition to supply services and goods to the government, law suits
and criminal investigations. Thus, Mexican companies, if acquiring a
United States enterprise that owns government contracts, must be
fully briefed on these issues. Otherwise, a Mexican company may un-
expectedly face a subpoena.
An additional legal impediment in this area deals with the Rules
of Origin. These Rules create havoc with goods which are slated for
use under a government contract. It is unlikely, especially in the cur-
rent political climate, that the United States will repeal the so-called
"Buy American Act." This legislation governs the contents of prod-
ucts sold to the United States government. Thus, if a Mexican com-
pany exceeds the specified percentages of value added in an export,
the Act is violated and a potential problem exists.
VIII. CURRENT MEXICAN INVESTMENT POSSIBILITIES
GREGORIO ESTRELLA:*
A. In the United States
Various reasons exist for Mexican companies' desire to invest in
the United States. First and foremost, the United States provides the
driving force behind every business, a market. The United States rep-
resents a huge potential market, especially for Mexican companies
manufacturing consumer retail products. The current gross domestic
product of the United States on a per capita basis is over six times that
of Mexico. Thus, Americans have a much greater disposable income
to spend on these products.
In addition, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Illinois,
and Colorado contain a huge Hispanic population. Many of these
states' inhabitants originated in Mexico, recognize Mexican products,
and would consume them. Mexican companies want to serve this
market more effectively, but limitations on their ability to do so exist.
Nonetheless, Mexican investors desire to invest in and acquire manu-
facturing and distribution facilities in serving the United States mar-
ket. Current examples of this trend include the establishment of
Agroupalpha, Avitro, and Cemex in the United States.
* U.N.A.M., Mexico City; M.B.A., New York University. Mr. Estrella has over 20
years of commercial banking experience with Banamex and Banca Serfin, Mexico's largest and
third largest commercial banks, respectively. He is currently the Founding Associate of a San
Diego-based merchant banking, investment banking firm specializing in cross-border and in-
ter-Pacific financing and foreign trade.
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A second major goal in entering the United States market is gain-
ing access to capital. Scarcity of capital and lending resources for the
Mexican borrower resulted directly from the 1982 nationalization of
Mexican banks and the prior history of the Mexican banking indus-
try. Most of the loans made were Mexican loans. Funding for these
loans originated in short term money that commercial banks provided
in the United States. The commercial banks hesitated, however, to
provide new funding to the Mexican banks for subsequent loans to
Mexican borrowers. The end result was a scarcity of capital in
Mexico.
The recent privatization of the Mexican banks opened new doors
and allowed fresh money to enter the Mexican banking system. As of
June 1991, the foreign offices of Mexican banks in London and New
York reportedly had accumulated $1.5 billion in short term money.
However, no money is available for two to three years, mostly for a
period up to sixty days.
In order to further internationalize the Mexican banking indus-
try, Mexican banks must form new partnerships and alliances with
financial institutions outside of Mexico. This practice bypasses the
Mexican credit risk for foreign banks by virtually becoming partners
with Mexican banks. Additionally, Mexican law now provides for
foreign banks' participation in acquiring Mexican banks. Although
the available financing remains at high peso rates of thirty to fifty
percent, the lending rate experienced tremendous improvement since
the late 1980s. At that time, the rates ranged from 120 to 150%.
This net result also results from the drop in inflation from 160% in
1987 to the current rate of about sixteen percent. Moreover, the Mex-
ican government hopes to decrease these rates even more.
B. Intra-Mexican and Foreign Investment Opportunities in Mexico
The possibility of huge returns on Mexican C.D.'s has existed for
some time. Most of the $1 billion represented by C.D.'s came from
Mexican investors themselves. Much of this money came from the
tremendous return of capital that took place in the early 1980s. This
movement marked a positive sign for the Mexican economy because
the repatriation of capital represented growing support for the econ-
omy. However, the high rates paid by the banks, up to fourteen per-
cent for six month money, were a well kept secret until late last year.
Originally, mostly European merchant banks were investing in these
C.D.'s. Recently, however, institutional investors from New York
[Vol. 15:909
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discovered the market, resulting in the Mexican banks lowering their
rates to about nine to ten percent. Maturities are also beginning to
expand from six to nine months.
A great block to foreign and intra-Mexican investment for many
years, however, was the chance of the devaluing of the peso. The
problem that existed in 1982 was that C.D.'s purchased in dollars
were convertible to pesos at the direction of the Mexican government
following the banks' nationalization. A number of years ago the gov-
ernment devalued the peso which eliminated most of the profit made
from investment in Mexican C.D.'s. Thus, an investment which
originated at a rate of 24 pesos to the dollar faced an inflated payout
ratio of 167 pesos to the dollar. As a result, the thirty percent returns
promised were not only wiped out, but investors wound up losing
money on a net basis. It is unlikely that the Salinas Government or
its successor, now that the banks have been re-privatized, would im-
pose that kind of exchange control, where dollar denominated C.D.'s
would only be honored in pesos. An agreement between the Govern-
ment, the workers, and the private sector hopes to maintain prices in
the sliding of the peso at forty pesos to the dollar on a daily basis.
The policy has been in effect for eighteen months since June 1991, and
at one point devaluation was limited to one peso per day.
IX. NAFTA AND THE FUTURE
A. NAFTA' s Passage
Currently NAFTA's effect on Mexico remains unclear. The cur-
rent thinking in Mexico, as previously mentioned, favors an open
economy and deregulation. This represents the Mexican govern-
ment's position for the past five or six years. Mexico desires to push
forward economically, and some observers suggest that the Mexican
government pushed the White House for NAFTA's passage. A
global economic situation will develop in which perceptions about
Mexico's economy will be important.
The world business community's general perception is that com-
panies in Mexico often bribe officials and cut corners. This, of course,
troubles companies that have completed business in Mexico. When-
ever one does business in a new country, it is very important to be-
come acquainted with that country's business practices. For example,
many Mexican investors travelled to California, but found themselves
ill-prepared and uninformed about United States business practices.
Due to this inexperience, these investors lost millions of dollars and
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returned to Mexico within a year or two. In addition, the converse
remains true as well; United States or European companies waste
money in Mexico due to unfamiliarity with the environment. How-
ever, many companies have overcome these barriers and enjoyed great
success. Seemingly, the companies uninterested in the opening of
Mexico's economy represented precisely those already located in
Mexico with a captive market.
Undoubtedly, NAFTA will force the reform of United States
laws, but this will benefit Mexican companies. Some trade liberaliza-
tion will also alleviate problems of anti-dumping and immigration.
The flow of people from Mexico northward will be eased as far as
business enterprises are concerned. If the trade agreement fails to
merit approval, the remaining United States legal structure will not
possess similar momentum and will impair the Mexican companies'
ability to do business in the United States.
B. Scarcity of Capital
In all probability, the scarcity of capital will continue for several
reasons. First, commercial banks desire to exit Mexico and Latin
America, due to the estimated $16.4 billion interest arrearage existing
on commercial loans. Second, because of changes in the communist
block, money previously invested by Western Europe in the region
will now be directed to Eastern Europe instead. Third, both the
United States and Japan are currently in cash-flow crises themselves.
Although the International Monetary Fund and World Bank provide
hope for new money for the region, these multilateral agencies face
troubled times as well. These groups' leaders express pessimism be-
cause of the recent net outflow of approximately $3 billion. Thus,
whether this limited influx of capital will support current plans for the
development of Mexico's economy remains unclear.
The internationalization of Mexico's economy and the Salinas
administration's economic development plan projects growth in GDP
between four and five percent annually. This would create growth
between $10 and $12 billion per year, but the capital has yet to flow
into the country. Mexico needs NAFTA in order to liberalize its
markets. If such a course is followed, Mexico will become an interna-
tional financial center, a gateway for the movement of capital into
Latin America. For instance, the J.P. Morgan Bank, among others,
possesses substantial Mexican and Latin American deposits and
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should become a bridge for moving capital between developing and
industrialized nations.
C. Future for Attorneys
Concurrent with these other changes, Mexico's legal environ-
ment is developing as well. The Mexican legal field is moving away
from restricted distribution agreements towards real openness in deal-
ing with internal trade by Mexican companies. These companies take
advantage of GATT and the elimination of tariffs and permits. New
joint ventures with United States and European companies position-
ing themselves in the Mexican market will force attorneys to deal
with the Rules of Origin and classification. Pacific Basin countries are
also attempting to enter the common market of Canada, Mexico, and
the United States through such joint enterprises. Since the Mexican
government eliminated the transfer of technology legislation and re-
formed current foreign investment law, investment has become un-
restricted. Thus, lawyers must adopt a more traditional legal role. As
deals continue to develop, this metamorphosis will continue as well.
D. The Underground Economy
In addition, a significant world underground economy exists in
Mexico. This type of economy arises in many places for diverse rea-
sons. Red tape, tax complications, and the lack of financing contrib-
ute to the development of such an economy. In a recent study by a
group of New York economists which resulted in the book Mexico
2000, it was estimated that between two to five percent of the GDP
came from Mexico's underground economy. The current gross na-
tional product of Mexico is approximately $220 billion, so this figure
is quite substantial. However, regardless of its size, the underground
economy represents a sociological situation which can be controlled
through proper measures.
E. Listing of Mexican Companies on United States
Stock Exchanges
A final area of concern is the listing of Mexican companies on the
United States stock exchanges and potential effects on the Mexico
City exchange. Currently, nothing prevents a Mexican company from
listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Typically, a United States
Depository Receipt, a certificate, is matched to another certificate in
the home country. Both certificates are handled by the Bank of New
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York and some other New York institutions. Such listing requires the
filing of an SEC disclosure in the "F" series. As Mexican companies
further develop, such registration will occur more frequently.
F Conclusion
Free trade involves the facilitated exchange of goods and serv-
ices, and also involves an exchange of investment opportunities. A
healthy trade environment always requires a bountiful amount of in-
vestment. This panel has presented the issues confronting those inves-
tors both inside and out of Mexico who will attempt to enter the
growing international Mexican economy. Although much of the pre-
ceding represents only expert prediction, this remains the only source
of information in this rapidly changing field.
